KFOR - "Failure to Protect" - A systemic failure of NATO

KFOR (Kosovo Force) - the NATO military mission with a mandate to protect ALL citizens of Kosovo - systemically failed to protect minorities in March 2004.

KFOR - mandate and capacities

Mandate (UN Resolution 1244)

KFOR's tasks:

• Ensuring a safe environment
• Protection of ALL citizens - regardless of ethnicity
• Demilitarization
• Support for UNMIK (the UN civil administration)
• Use of force if necessary to protect civilians

Capacities in March 2004

Number of soldiers: 17,500

• France: 3,500
• Italy: 3,200
• Germany: 2,800
• USA: 2,000
• United Kingdom: 1,700
• Other NATO countries + partners: 4,300

• Tanks, armored vehicles
• Helicopters
• Modern weaponry
• Communications equipment

Intelligence BEFORE the violence

KFOR KNEW

14-15 March (2-3 days before):

• Intelligence reports: Albanian extremists are planning violence
• Mobile phones intercepted: Conversations about "cleansing the Serbs"
• Informants: Buses booked for 17 March (transporting attackers)
• Albanian media: Hate rhetoric intensified

Human Rights Watch: "If you had information, why did you not deploy additional patrols PREVENTIVELY? You had 17,500 soldiers - you could have protected 150,000 minorities."

KFOR reaction during the violence - TOO LATE

17 March - The first day

Mitrovica (10:00):

• A crowd of 5,000 Albanians moves toward the Serbian side
• KFOR sets up barricades - GOOD
• Stops the crowd - SUCCESS

• Attack on a Serbian church
• KFOR reaction: LATE BY 1 HOUR
• The church is already burning when they arrive

• Attack on the monastery
• KFOR evacuates the nuns - GOOD
• But does not prevent the destruction of the monastery - BAD

18 March - The worst day

30+ attacks simultaneously:

• KFOR OVERWHELMED by the number of events
• They cannot be everywhere at once

• The attack begins at 14:00
• KFOR arrives at 16:00 - 2 HOURS LATER
• By then - 150 houses burned, 3 dead

• 6 churches attacked
• KFOR patrols OBSERVE
• Do not intervene

• 30 soldiers vs 3,000 attackers
• Reinforcements arrive 30 minutes late
• Partial destruction in the meantime

Why did KFOR not intervene?

Official explanations

1. Being overstretched: "There were 30+ attacks simultaneously. We could not be everywhere." Response:

• You had intelligence - you could have deployed patrols PREVENTIVELY
• 17,500 soldiers is ENOUGH to cover 30 locations

2. Fear of conflict: "We were afraid that intervention would provoke a larger conflict with the Albanian community." Response:

• Your mandate is the PROTECTION of civilians, not political stability
• If you are afraid of conflict - why are you there?

3. Lack of clear orders: "Commanders in the field did not know whether they were allowed to use force." Response:

• The Rules of Engagement (ROE) were clear - protection of civilians is the priority
• It is an organizational failure if commanders do not know the mandate

Unofficial theories

A political decision:

• NATO and the EU wanted the stability of Kosovo
• The Albanians are the majority - they did not want to antagonize them
• A "lesser evil" (ethnic violence) was allowed to avoid a "greater evil" (instability)
• The Serbs are an "acceptable loss"

• KFOR patrols OBSERVED churches burning - they did not intervene
• Commanders admitted: "We received orders not to open fire"
• The activation of additional forces was DELAYED by several hours

Human Rights Watch report - "Failure to Protect"

Title: "Failure to Protect: Anti-Minority Violence in Kosovo, March 2004" Published: July 2004 Key conclusions:

• "UNMIK and KFOR KNEW that violence was being prepared"
• "They had the CAPABILITY to prevent it"
• "They did NOT protect the minorities"
• "This is a systemic failure, not an individual error"

Reactions of NATO and the UN

NATO

NATO Secretary General (Jaap de Hoop Scheffer): "March 2004 was the worst day for KFOR since its arrival in 1999. We have learned the lessons and increased our readiness." Measures after March 2004:

• Increase in the number of soldiers (temporary)
• Better coordination
• Stronger presence around minority settlements

• No one responsible WAS dismissed
• No one WAS disciplined
• Zero accountability

The UN

UN Special Representative (Harri Holkeri): "March 2004 showed that we were not sufficiently prepared. We must do better." BUT:

• Holkeri resigned 6 months later (June 2004)
• Admitted that he could not control the situation

Comparison - Srebrenica and Kosovo 2004

Srebrenica 1995:

• UN "safe area"
• 400 Dutch UN soldiers
• Did NOT protect 8,000 Bosniaks
• The UN acknowledged the failure, apologized

• KFOR "protection"
• 17,500 NATO soldiers
• Did NOT protect the minorities
• NATO did NOT acknowledge the systemic failure
• They did NOT apologize

The UN acknowledged the Srebrenica failure. NATO did not acknowledge the Kosovo 2004 failure.

Lessons (or the lack of lessons)

What did we learn?

• International forces can OBSERVE ethnic violence and not intervene
• The "protection of civilians" mandate means nothing without political will
• 17,500 soldiers is not enough if there is NO decision to intervene
• Accountability does not exist - no one held responsible

KFOR today (2025)

• Number of soldiers: ~4,000 (reduced from 17,500)
• Task: Still the protection of minorities
• Success: There have been no mass pogroms since 2004
• BUT: The Serbs still live under constant KFOR protection - they are not safe without it

"KFOR managed to prevent new mass violence after 2004. But that is not because it learned a lesson - it is because the Serbs have already been expelled. There is no one to protect because there is no one to attack - the ethnic cleansing is complete." - Amnesty International, 2010.